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IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that a personal representative under a

will did not commit an actionable breach of her fiduciary duty when she disregarded testamentary
instructions and converted estate funds for her own use rather than funding a testamentary bypass
trust, as instructed by the will?
2.

If a will instructs the personal representative to place the residue of the estate in

trust and that the principal of the trust is only to be invaded and distributed to the life beneficiary
"as is necessary for maintenance and support. . .," may or must the trustee consider the life
beneficiary's independent assets and resources before the principal may be invaded9 Did the Utah
Court of Appeals incorrectly analyze the meaning and effect of such testamentary instructions
when it excused (1) the personal representative's failure to fund the trust and (2) the personal
representative's unilateral invasion of estate principal for her own benefit, without consultation
with the co-trustee of the unfunded trust and when she had abundant independent resources of her
own?
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V. OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter is published at the following citation:
In re Estate of Marjorie S. Sims. Neil R. Mitchell v. Lynda Wood. 918 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).

VI. GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
1.

Mr. Mitchell seeks review of the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, entered in this

matter on May 19, 1996 (the "Opinion"). (A copy of the Opinion is attached in Appendix A).
2.

Mr. Mitchell petitioned the Court of Appeals for rehearing, which petition was

denied by order dated July 19, 1996. (A copy of the Order Denying Rehearing is attached in
Appendix A).
3.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5).

VII. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Mr. Mitchell submits that the following Utah statutes are controlling:
Utah Code Ann., §§ 75-3-703, 75-3-711, and 75-3-909 (Copies are attached hereto in
Appendix C)
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VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim made against the estate of Marjorie S. Sims who acted as

personal representative of her husband's estate and who breached her fiduciary duties as set forth
in her husband's will. Mr. Mitchell, as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of
G. Grant Sims (the "Estate"), filed a claim against the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, a probate
proceeding pending in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under
Probate No. 933900278 ES. Marjorie S. Sims was the original personal representative under the
Last Will and Testament of G. Grant Sims (the "Will"). (A copy of the Will is attached in
Appendix C). Under the Will, Marjorie Sims had specific duties which she did not carry out, and
she converted funds of the Estate to her own use, contrary to the Will's specific instructions. The
Estate was damaged by these actions and, therefore, Mr. Mitchell, as Successor Personal
Representative of the Estate, presented the claim against the estate of Marjorie S. Sims after her
death.
On or about August 18, 1993, Lynda Wood (uMs. Wood"), as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, denied Mr. Mitchell's claim. Mr. Mitchell then filed his Petition
and First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim, setting forth before the trial court his
position that Marjorie Sims breached her fiduciary duty under the Will, that she misappropriated
funds of the Estate, and that her estate was liable for the return of those funds.
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B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Mr. Mitchell moved the Trial Court for summary judgment on his Petition. Ms. Wood

also moved for summary judgment seeking to deny his claim. After oral argument, the Trial
Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting in part and denying in part both motions.
(Copies of the Memorandum Decision and accompanying Order are attached in Appendix B).
Mr. Mitchell filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court on July 19, 1995, taking appeal from
that part of the Trial Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment that denied part of
Mr. Mitchell's Motion and granted part of Ms. Wood's Motion. Pursuant to this Court's pourover jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the appeal was heard by the Utah Court of
Appeals. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed that part of the
Trial Court's Order denying Mr. Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court of
Appeals did, however, reverse part of the Trial Court's Order that allowed Mrs. Sims' estate to
retain $1,900.00 as personal representative fees.
Mr. Mitchell petitioned the Court of Appeals to rehear the appeal. The petition was
denied on July 19, 1996. Mr. Mitchell now seeks review of that part of the Court of Appeals'
Opinion that affirms the Trial Court's Order denying Mr. Mitchell's motion.
C.

Statement of Facts
G Grant Sims ("Grant") died on November 14, 1991, leaving his Last Will and Testament

(the "Will"). Trial Court Record ("R."), at 61, 117. The Will named Grant's wife, Marjorie S.
Sims ("Marge") as personal representative of Grant's Estate (the "Estate"), and appointed Marge
and Mr Mitchell as co-trustees of a testamentary trust named, "The George Grant Sims Estate
4

Tax Bypass Trust" (the "Trust"). R. 64, 65. Marge was not a beneficiary under the Will except
as to items of personal property. R. 62.
The Will instructed Marge as personal representative to fund the Trust with the residue of
the Estate. R. 62-63. The Will and the Trust also provided that Trust income be paid to Marge
without condition, but that the co-trustees "shall also distribute" to Marge "as much of the
principal as is necessary for her proper health, support, and maintenance and to maintain her in the
standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] lifetime." R. 62-63. The Will further directed
that the Trust corpus be distributed to other beneficiaries upon Marge's death. R. 63-64.
From the date of Grant's death on November 14, 1991, until Marge's death on
February 27, 1993, Marge served as Personal Representative of the Estate. R. 7, 258. After her
death, Mr. Mitchell was appointed Successor Personal Representative under the Will and
continues to function in that capacity. R. 62-64, 258.
During the fifteen months Marge functioned as Personal Representative of the Estate, she
never funded the Trust. R. 248, 511. Although she was not entitled to receive money personally
from the Estate, she nonetheless drew checks on the Estate checking account in the amount of
$96,642.55 to pay for personal living expenses (the "Checking Account Payments"). R. 281-82,
351, 355-58. Marge's expenditures were carefully recorded during her life by the accounting
firm of Grant Thornton. R. 350-71.
At the date of Grant's death, the value of the Estate was $420,204.64. R. 329-30. At that
same time, Marge's net worth was $515,455.21. R. 282-283. At the date of Marge's death, the
value of her estate was at least $522,078.29 while Grant's Estate had been seriously depleted by
5

Marge's withdrawals. R. 282. At the time Grant executed the Will, Marge simultaneously
executed a will identical to Grant's Will, naming the same devisees and beneficiaries. R 570-71.
Marge revoked her duplicate will after Grant died. Her new will, currently being probated, named
as devisees Respondent, Lynda Wood ("Ms. Wood") and her brother and mother, Terry and
Wanda Short. R. 544.
On or about May 8, 1993, Mr. Mitchell filed a claim against the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims
to recover the Checking Account Payments and other funds (the "Claim"). The Claim was denied
by Ms. Wood, as Personal Representative, on August 18, 1993. R. 17, 47, 161. Mr. Mitchell
then filed his Petition and First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim and moved the Trial
Court for summary judgment on the Claim based on the fact that Marge had used money of the
Estate in contravention of the terms of the Will. R. 50, 207, 345. Ms. Wood also moved for
summary judgment seeking to disallow the Claim. R. 381.
The Trial Court granted both motions in part and denied both motions in part. R. 510-15,
520-22. Specifically, as to the Checking Account Payments, the Trial Court found that it was not
disputed that Marge had breached her fiduciary duty to fund the Trust. R. 511-12. Nonetheless,
the Trial Court concluded that the moneys she took from the Estate were funds to which she
would have been entitled, "as a matter of law," had the Trust been funded. R. 511. As support
for this conclusion, the Trial Court, without further explanation, found that "the intent of
Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries."
R. 511. As such, the Trial Court ruled that the breach was not actionable. R. 511-12.
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On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's Order regarding the
Checking Account Payments. It stated:
We agree with the trial court's determination that "while there was a technical
breach of [Marge's] fiduciary responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach
resulted in no damages and therefore is not actionable."
918 P.2d at 135. In arriving at this conclusion, however, the Court of Appeals paraphrased the
relevant testamentary language in such a way as to alter its meaning. It omitted certain words in
its analysis that made it appear as though the Will placed no restrictions on, and essentially
mandated, the distribution of Trust principal to Marge. The court reached its holding with little
or no analysis of Grant's testamentary intent or the effect of the "as is necessary" restriction in the
Will.
Mr. Mitchell now seeks review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion.

IX. ARGUMENT
The following arguments set forth "special and important reasons," within the meaning of
Rule 46, Utah R. App. P., justifying review of the Court of Appeals' Opinion by writ of
certiorari.

7

POINT I
BY EXCUSING MARGE'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND HAS SANCTIONED
SIMILAR DEPARTURES BY LOWER COURTS
The Utah Uniform Probate Code imposes fiduciary duties upon personal representatives
and places them under a duty to strictly adhere to testamentary instructions Utah Code Ann
§ 75-3-703(1) provides that "A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and this
code

" (emphasis added) Accordingly, Marge, as personal representative under the Will, was

under a duty to carry out the terms of the Will with exactness and in conformity with the probate
code
Both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that Marge breached that
fiduciary duty but that the breach was not actionable against her estate The Court of Appeals
therefore allowed Marge to completely ignore the terms and instructions of the Will The court
failed to pay deference to Grant's intent, as set forth in clear and unambiguous terms, and it
excused Marge's breach of fiduciary duty The Court of Appeals sanctioned, in its published
Opinion, the wholesale disregard for such testamentary instructions It is clear from the terms of
the Will that Grant intended to benefit not only his spouse, but also the Remainder Beneficiaries
listed in the Will and Trust The Court of Appeals' Opinion, however, obviated that intent
Regardless of whatever estate tax planning vehicles or mechanisms employed by testators for the
benefit of ultimate heirs, beneficiaries, or remaindermen in the future, this Opinion will render
8

such careful planing a nullity by permitting personal representatives to substitute their own
choices and desires for those of the testator.
Marge's breach of duty, carried to a logical extreme, could have been far more damaging
to Grant's Estate and still have been excused under the Opinion. If, for example, she had been
younger and in better health at the time Grant died, Marge could have left her own assets
untouched, which she did, and she could have completely exhausted all of Grant's Estate on
travel entertainment, and luxury purposes. Based on the record, the couple lived "lavishly," and
she could have justified these expenditures of Grant's Estates' money as "maintaining] her in the
standard of living that she enjoyed during [Grant's] lifetime." Under the Opinion, that behavior
would be perfectly acceptable, regardless of the fact that the Trust had never been formed, the cotrustees had never been appointed, Grant's beneficiaries would be left with nothing, and Marge's
estate—left untouched-would have grown larger by the day. While Marge did not entirely deplete
Grant's Estate, she did manage to significantly deplete it during her brief tenure as personal
representative. In future cases, however, the logical extreme, while completely unfair to similarly
situated remainder beneficiaries, is foreseeable because the Opinion's analysis is so scant and its
language so broad. This Court should, therefore, grant certiorari to review the Opinion and
ensure that such a rule does not become the law of this state and that such an undesirable
outcome does not occur in the future..
Further, the Court of Appeals failed to properly analyze testamentary intent in the
Opinion. It is a cannon of testamentary construction that courts must look to the four corners of
the will in order to determine the testator's intent. Where an ambiguity exists, courts are then
9

authorized to examine the surrounding circumstances. Boyle v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co.. 866 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this case, Mr. Mitchell has argued that the terms of
the will clearly prohibit Marge's unfettered access to Estate principal. One fact alone—that Grant
required two co-trustees to control the Trust and make distribution conditioned on Marge's
necessity—demonstrates that intent. The Court of Appeals made no mention whatsoever of this
evidence that Grant wished to have another person involved in the decision of which distributions
of principal, if any, should be made to Marge during her lifetime. Had the Trust been created and
funded, Marge could not have unilaterally withdrawn the funds as she did. To the extent any
ambiguities exist as to the meaning and effect of such terms, the Court of Appeals should have
remanded the matter for further factual determination.
The Court of Appeals made little or no attempt to analyze these terms or others in the Will
to ascertain how they reflected Grant's testamentary intent. Because both parties argued that the
terms had different meaning and effect, the court should have, at the very least, remanded the
matter to the trial court for further factual determination regarding the circumstances surrounding
the creation of the Will. The Court of Appeals' failure to correctly determine Grant's intent and
its failure to attempt to analyze surrounding circumstances should be reviewed by this Court.
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POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN IMPORTANT
QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE,
DECIDED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This appeal presents a question of first impression. Specifically, Utah courts have never
interpreted the testamentary language at issue here or determined the meaning and effect of the
instructions that trustees only "distribute as much of the principal as is necessary for proper health
support and maintenance. . . ." In this case, Marge had abundant personal wealth. None of the
Trust's principal (had the Trust even been funded) would have been "necessary" for Marge's
maintenance or support because she could have easily paid for those expenses with her own
funds. The record reflects that at the time of Grant's death, Marge's personal worth was
approximately one-half million dollars, which only grew larger until her death. It is therefore
necessary for this Court to determine if the "as is necessary" language permits or requires a
personal representative or trustee to examine the beneficiary's independent resources before
invading principal on their behalf.
Courts from many other jurisdictions have addressed this issue and have determined that a
trustee is permitted—and in some cases, required—to examine the beneficiaries' independent
resources before invading trust principal on their behalf. See, e.g.. Dunklee v. Kettering. 225
P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950), which is a well-reasoned and well-supported decision on this issue.1
1

The Dunklee court relies upon several similar cases: In re Martin's Will. 199 N.E. 491,
492 (NY. 1936) ("the private income of the beneficiary must be considered in determining
whether such need exists"); In re Seacrist's Estate. 66 A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1949) ("To know the
quality and quantity of [the beneficiary's] private estate becomes very material in order to
11

Several courts have held that even if the will instructs that the "trustee shall distribute principal,"
the trustee is entitled to consider the beneficiaries' other assets before making an invasion into the
principal of the trust.2 This rationale is sound. The trustee has a fiduciary duty to remainder
beneficiaries and must safeguard their interests against improper access to trust principal. If the
life beneficiary can easily pay expenses with her own assets, as in this case, then to distribute
principal to her is contrary to the interests of the remainder beneficiaries and a violation of
fiduciary responsibility..

determine his good faith and his necessities."); Board of Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust
Company. 46 A.2d 280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946) ("circumstances and income of the beneficiary
should be taken into consideration in determining whether to invade the principal of the trust.");
Bridgeport City Trust Company v. Beech. 174 A. 308 (Conn. 1934) (holding under similar
circumstances and testamentary language that, without a showing of need, principal may not be
invaded.).
Subsequent to the Dunklee decision, several other jurisdictions analyzed the issue and
rendered similar holdings. See, e.g.. Sibson v. First National Bank & Trust Company. 165 A.2d
800 (N.J. Supp. Ct. 1960) ("the separate income of the life tenant must be considered in determining whether it is necessary to invade corpus."); Security-People's Trust Company v. United
States. 238 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965) ("Since there are a series of further life beneficiaries and
remaindermen, the trustee would be under a strong duty to protect their interests in the face of
any request of the [wife] for invasion. Under the Pennsylvania decisions, a court would be bound
to look into the assets of her own estate, which were well known to the trustee, who managed
them."); N.C.N.B. National Bank of Florida v. Shanaberger. 616 So.2d 96 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that in order to fulfill fiduciary his obligation, the trustee was required to look at the life
beneficiary's own assets to determine whether there was a need to invade the principal).
2

See. e.g.. In re Will of Flyer. 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that even though the
trustee had absolute and sole discretion, the testamentary gift of principal was conditioned upon
the widow's need); Hull v. Holloway. 20 A. 445, 447 (Conn. 1889) ("So long as [the husband] is
able to support himself. . ., the trustee has no right to pay over to him, . . ., any portion of the
income or principal of the trust fund."); Stemple v. Middletown Trust Company. 15 A.2d 305
(Conn. 1940) ("[beneficiary's] personal estate, . . . is to be taken into account by the trustees in
future payments to her.").
12

This is a significant question of state law, as this language is commonly utilized in
testamentary instruments. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the provision, however, is
disappointingly insufficient given the importance of the issue. While the court properly
characterized many of the facts, it simply glossed over many others. It also misquoted,
paraphrased, and omitted words from the "as is necessary" restriction in its Opinion. By so doing,
it altered the syntax, meaning, and effect of the phrase. The analysis, therefore, fits the court's
ultimate conclusion but does not square with the plain language of the Will.
One example of this distortion is found on page 4 of the Opinion. After setting forth the
full language of the provision, the court then paraphrases it as follows:
The language of the Will clearly states that Mrs. Sims shall receive distributions
from the principal of Mr. Sims' Estate "necessary for her proper health, support,
and maintenance."
918 P.2d at 134. Significantly, the Opinion omits the words "as is," which modify and qualify the
word "necessary." This omission changes the phrase's meaning entirely and transforms it into an
unqualified requirement for the trustee to distribute principal to Marge.
In the next sentence of the Opinion, the court again alters the language of the Will. In
responding to Mr. Mitchell's argument that the phrase "as is necessary" requires the Trustee to
consider the beneficiary's independent resources before distributing principal, the court states:
We need not address that question because Mr. Sims' Will does not merely
authorize the invasion of the principal for the "necessities of life.". . . Instead,
Mr. Sims' Will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have access to the principal "to
maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in the standard of living that she enjoyed during my
lifetime."

13

Again, the court omits the phrase "as is necessary" and glosses over the issue. The court's
rendition of the provision makes it appear that Marge was to have unfettered access to the
principal of the Trust, which is not what is dictated by the plain language of the Will. Again, the
alteration fits the court's conclusion, but not the reality of the Will.
Further, by omitting the "as is necessary" language from the quote and focusing, instead,
on the "shall distribute" language, the court expressly avoided addressing the core issue of the
meaning of the phrase "as is necessary" in this context. The court's avoidance of this analytical
responsibility is improper, particularly in an opinion designated for publication on an issue never
before addressed by the appellate courts of Utah. Such an issue deserves more careful analysis
and should therefore be addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. Those individual and corporate
trustees in Utah who make daily decisions regarding disbursements of funds held in trust based on
similar language are entitled to the analysis and guidance of this Court to assist them in fulfilling
their fiduciary duties.

14

XI. CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED
Mr. Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals and that it review the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter.
DATED this /

/

day of August, 1996.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Kim R. Wilson
David L. Pinkston
Attorneys for Appellant, Neil R. Mitchell
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FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MAY 1 6 1996
COURT OF APPEALS

ooCcc
In the Matter of the Estate of
Marjorie S. Sims, Deceased.

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Neil Mitchell,

Case No. 950724-CA

Appellant and Crossappellee,

FILED
(M»v 1*

1 ccr '

Lynda Wood,
Appellee and Crcssacceliant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
Attorneys

John E. Gates, Kim R. Wilson, and David L. Pinkston,
S a l t Lake City, f o r Appellant and C r o s s - a p p e l l e e
John L. McCoy, S a l t Lake C i t y , for A p p e l l e e and
Cross-appellant

Before Judges D a v i s , 3ench, and Jackson.
BENCH, Judge:
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial courtfs entry of summary
judgment in favor of Marjorie Sims's estate. Lynda Wood crossappeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long married life
together. Mr. Sims died in 1991, leaving a will which provided
for the creation of a bypass trust and designated Mrs. Sims the
personal representative of his estate. He also named Mrs. Sims
and Mitchell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was to be
funded from the residue of his estate. The will provided that
trust income was to be paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The

will further provided that the trustees were required tt
distribute to Mrs. Sims as much cf the principal as necessary for
her proper health, support, and maintenance. After Mrs. Sims's
death, the residue cf the trust's corpus was to be distributed to
other beneficiaries, including both Mitchell and Weed.
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as personal
representative, she never funded the trust. Instead, sr.e
withdrew 396,642.55 directly from the estate checking account to
pay for her personal living and rr.edical expenses. Mrs. Sims
received an additional $52,875.4: from the estate, derived from a
$50,000 certificate cf deposit plus interest. Finally, Mrs. Sims
received a $12,445.66 personal injury settlement for injuries Mr.
Sims had sustained before his death.
Mrs. Sims died in 1993. Her will named Wood as the personal
representative cf her estate. Mitchell, as cc-trustee and a
remainder person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim against Mrs.
Sims's estate for the monies that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr.
Sims's estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 from the certificate
of deposit in Mr. Sims's name had been wrongfully taken from Mr.
Sims's estate.1 Mitchell moved for summary judgment for return
of all the funds removed from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed
for summary judgment seeking to disallow Mitchell's claim.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part both
parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court found
that Mrs. Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that she was
nonetheless entitled to the $96,642.55 from the estate checking
account. The trial court determined that the funds were used for
her necessary support and maintenance and that there was
therefore no damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the
certificate of deposit, the trial court found that $48,100 was
undisputedly owed by Mrs. Sims's estate and crdered that amount
paid to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The trial court
also allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to retain the $2875.40 in
interest income from the certificate of deposit and the $1900
claimed as personal representative fees. Finally, the trial
court found that Mrs. Sims's acceptance of the $12,445.36
personal injury settlement was an improper diversion of the money
from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded that amount to Mr. Sims's
estate.
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's decision concerning
the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims withdrew from the estate checking
1. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was entitled tc the
$2875.40 in interest and an additional $1900 as personal
representative fees.
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a c c o u n t and t h e a l l o w a n c e of i n t e r e s t income and p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e s from t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of d e p o s i t .
Weed c r o s s a p p e a l s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r of Mr. S i m s ' s
e s t a t e on t h e p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s e t t l e m e n t amount a n d award of
interest.
STANDARD CF REVIEW
Summary j u d g m e n t i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y when no g e n u i n e i s s u e s
of m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o
j u d e m e n t as a m a t t e r of law. Utah R. C i v . ? . 5 6 ( c ) ; K i r g i n s v .
S a l t Lake C o u n t y . 855 P.2d 2 3 1 , 225 (Utah 1 5 5 3 ) .
Because
e n t i t l e m e n t t o summary judgment i s a q u e s t i o n of l a w , we a c c o r d
no d e f e r e n c e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of t h e l e g a l i s s u e s
presented.
I d . : F e r r - e v . S t a t e . 784 P . 2 d 145, 151 (Utah 1989) .
ANALYSIS
A.

Estate Checking Account

Mitchell first argues that the trial court erred when it
allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to keep the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims
had drawn from the checking account of Mr. Sims's estate.
Mitchell contends that because Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust
provided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return all the money to
Mr. bims's estate. We disagree.
Mr. Sims declared in his will that
[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs.
Sims] without any conditions, all of the
income of said trust. The trustees shall
also distribute as much of the principal as
is necessary for her proper health, support,
and maintenance and to maintain her in the
standard of living that she enjoyed during my
lifetime.
The trial court found that although Mrs. Sims did not fund the
trust, she was entitled to the funds since they were used for her
support and maintenance. The record reflects that Mrs. Sims
spent approximately 576,000 from the estate's checking account on
her medical expenses. The balance of the money drawn" from the
estate's checking account was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses.
The accounting report and affidavit of the accountant for Mr.
Sims's estate confirm these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely that the expense
accounting was irrelevant because any money used was "irmsroperly
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converted from the estate." Because Mitchell did net challenge
Mrs. Sims's expenses below, he is precluded frcm challenging them
on appeal. Jensen v. Sowcut. 892 ?.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah
App.)(holding acquiescence to opposing argument before trial
court precluded challenge on appeal), cert, denied. 895 ?.2d 1231
(Utah 1995); see alsc Salt Lake*City v. Ohms. 381 P.2d 544, 847
(Utah 1994! (stating court will review only those issues
presented below unless exceptional circumstances or plain error
are shown; .'
The language of the will clearly states that Mrs. Sims shall
receive distributions from the principal of Mr. Sims's estate
"necessary for her prccer heath, support, and maintenance."
Mitchell argues that, in other jurisdictions, the use of "as is
necessary" language requires the beneficiaries of a trust to
exhaust their own resources before invadinc trust principal. See
Sunklgg v. Ketterinc. 225 P.2d 853, 855-57* (Colo. 1950)." But see
In re Estate of Lincrren. 885 P.2d 1280, 12S2-S3 (Mont. 1994).
We need net address that question because Mr. Sims's will does
not merely authorize the invasion of the principal for "the
necessities of life." Dunklee, 225 P.2d at S53. Instead, Mr.
Sims's will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have access tc the
principal "to maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in the standard cf living
that she enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefcre^ we agree with
the trial court's determination that "while there was a technical
breach of her fiduciary responsibilities tc fund the bypass
trusty the breach resulted in no damages and therefore is not
actionable."
E.

Certificate of Deposit

Mitchell challenges the trial court's award to Mrs. Sims's
estate of S1900 in personal representative fees and $2875.40 that
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from Mr. Sims's $50,000
certificate of deposit. Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's
estate did not properly petition the trial court for the $1900 in
claimed personal•representative fees pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. §
75-3-718(1) (1993) . Wood stated in her Memorandum in Response to
Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment that she deducted from the
$50,000 "$1900 as fees for acting as personal representative."
We need not decide whether this qualifies as a proper claim
2. Mitchell also claims that Wood should be estopped from
claiming Mrs. Sims's estate had no liability towards Mr. Sims's
estate. Mitchell concedes that estoppel is a new argument but
contends that it is not a new issue. However, "[w]e decline to
honor such a distinction." One Int'1 (U.S.A.i Inc. v. llth Ave.
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993). Consequently, we will
not address the estcccel issue.
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pursuant to section
to support the fees
judgment. See Utah
that portion of the

75-3-718(1),. since Wood provided r.c evidence
after Mitchell challenged them on summary
R. Civ. P. 5£ !c) . Consequently, we reverse
award.

Mitchell also asserts that the trial court improperly
awarded Mrs. Sims's estate $2875.40 in claimed interest from the
certificate of deposit. Wood argues that the money was interest
earned from the certificate of deposit in Mr. Sims's name and
that, since Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the beneficiary of
all income from Mr. Sims's estate, she was entitled to >eep the
interest earned. Mitchell simply contends that because the trust
was not funded, Mrs. Sims did net have the right to keep that
money. We disagree. Again, although Mrs. Sims did net fund the
trust as Mr. Sims's will directed, Mr. Sims explicitly stated
that Mrs. Sims was to receive the income from Mr. Sims's estate
"without condition." Thus, the trial court properly allowed Mrs.
Sims's estate to retain the interest from the certificate of
deposit.
C.

Settlement Proceeds

Wood cross-appeals the trial court's order to return to Mr.
Sims's estate the $12,445.86 received from the settlement of Mr.
Sims's personal injury claim. Weed argues that since Mrs. Sims
claims to have paid a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical
expenses,
Mrs. Sims could retain the settlement proceeds pursuant
to Ufekh's survival statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides:
If prior to judgment or settlement the
injured person dies as a result of a cause
other than the injury received as a result of
the wrongful act or negligence of the
wrongdoer, the personal representative or
heirs of that person are entitled to receive
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by or on behalf of that injured
person as the result of his injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (b) (1992) . According to Utah's
survival statute, Mrs. Sims could only recover the personal
injury settlement in her capacity as personal representative of
Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Est—e, 117
Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that she is
entitled to the settlement proceeds is misplaced. Behn is a
wrongful death case and not a personal injury settlement case.
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs of the decedent
personally hold claims for lost support and other personal
losses. See Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2df878, 879 (Utah App. 1994).
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In a personal injury case, by comparison, the cause of action is
owned not by the heirs, but by the injured party. As personal
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs. Sims was therefore
authorized to receive the settlement only en behalf of his
estate. Mrs. Sims could then present a claim to his estate for
out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the survival statute. She
has never done that.3 We therefore affirm the trial court's
award of the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate.
We have considered the other issues raised, and we adjudge
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we do not address them.
£££ Stat* v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("Court need
not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue
or claim-raised."), cert, denied."lis S. Ct. 163' (1995;.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of the trial court except as to the
award of SLrOO in personal representative fees. That portion of
the judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial
court for entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

3- Mrs. Sims'.s estate argues that because she was Mr. Sims's
"only surviving intestate heir, " she is entitled to the
settlement proceeds. However, it is evident that Mr. Sims did
not die intestate. He had a will that designated Mrs. Sims as
the personal representative, and devisee of personal property.
Thus, she could not take the settlement as an intestate heir.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Marjorie S. SIMS, Deceased.
Neil MITCHELL, Appellant
and Cross-Appellee,
v.
Lynda WOOD, Appellee and
Cross-Appellant.
No. 950734-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 16, 1996.
Co-trustee and remainderman of dece^
dent's husband's estate brought claim
against decedent's estate for monies removed
from husband's estate. Co-trustee and remainderman and personal representative for
decedent's estate cross-moved for summary
judgment. The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson>
J., granted in part and denied in part both
motions. Parties cross-appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) decedent's estate was not required to remit to
husband's estate funds decedent had withdrawn from husband's estate's checking account; (2) decedent's estate was not entitled
to personal representative fee award from
husband's estate; (3) decedent's estate was
entitled to retain interest earned on certificate of deposit that had been part of husband's estate; and (4) decedent was not entitled to receive settlement from testator's
personal injury claim.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1)
Inasmuch as entitlement to summary
judgment is question of law, reviewing court
accords no deference to trial court's resolution of legal issues presented.
2. Executors and Administrators @=>81
Although personal representative's failure to fund husband's testamentary trust
with estate residue was technical breach of

quired to remit to husband's estate fimdg
personal representative withdrew from hu$.
band's estate checking account, given wiD
provision that personal representative w&
entitled to trust principal as needed for her
medical and living expenses and trial court's
finding that withdrawn funds were used for
personal representative's support and maintenance.
3. Executors and Administrators (3=5256(4)
Trust residuary beneficiary, whose claim
against settlor's surviving spouse's estate for
monies she removed from settlor's estate was
denied, was precluded on appeal of that denial from challenging medical and living expenses of spouse, who, pursuant to settlors
will, was entitled to distributions of tros
principal to extent required for such expenses, by his failure to challenge expenses
below.
4. Appeal and Error <3=>170(1)
Appellate court would not address estoppel argument raised for first time on appeal,
despite appellant's contention that issue was
not new even though argument was.
5. Executors and Administrators <2>501
Judgment <S=>185.3(1)
Estate of personal representative of testator's estate was not entitled to personal
representative fee award from testator's estate when personal representative's estate
failed to provide evidence to support award
after co-trustee and residuary beneficiary d
testator's testamentary trust challenged fees
on summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc
Rule 56(e).
6. Executors and Administrators <s=*313
. Interest earned on certificate of deporf
that was part of testator's estate was prop**
ly retained by testator's spouse's estate, ei*
though spouse, as personal representatfl*
had failed to fund testator's testaments
trust, given will provision granting spofl*
right to receive estate's income without c *
dition.
7. Executors and Administrators @^49
Testator's surviving spouse, who *R
served as personal representative of h * 5 ^
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testator's personal injury claim on ground to be funded from the residue of his estate.
that she paid large portion of testator's medi- The will provided that trust income was to be
cal expenses; under survival statute, spouse paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The
could recover settlement only in her capacity will further provided that the trustees were
as personal representative on behalf of es- required to distribute to Mrs. Sims as much
tate, and could then present claim to estate of the principal as necessary for her proper
for out-of-pocket expenses. U.CA1953, 78- health, support, and maintenance. After
Mrs. Sims's death, the residue of the trust's
ll-12(l)(b).
corpus was to be distributed to other benefi8. Death ®=>7
ciaries, including both Mitchell and Wood.
In wrongful death cause of action, heirs
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as
of decedent personally hold claims for lost
personal
representative, she never funded
support and other personal losses, while in
personal injury case, cause of action is owned the trust. Instead, she withdrew $96,642.55
directly from the estate checking account to
not by heirs, but by injured party.
pay for her personal living and medical ex9. Descent and Distribution <3=>45
penses. Mrs. Sims received an additional
Testator's surviving spouse could not $52,875.40 from the estate, derived from a
take testator's personal injury settlement as $50,000 certificate of deposit plus interest.
testator's only surviving intestate heir; testa- Finally, Mrs. Sims received a $12,445.86 pertor, who had will that designated spouse as sonal injury settlement for injuries Mr. Sims
personal representative and de^see oi per- "had sustained "before "his death.
sonal property, did not die intestate.
Mrs. Sims died in 1993. Her will named
Wood as the personal representative of her
John E. Gates, Kim R. Wilson, and David estate. Mitchell, as co-trustee and a remainL. Pinkston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant der person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim
against Mrs. Sims's estate for the monies
and Cross-Appellee.
that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr. Sims's
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for Appel- estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 from
lee and Cross-appellant.
the certificate of deposit in Mi\ Sims's name
had been wrongfully taken from Mr. Sims's
Before DAVIS, BENCH and JACKSON,
estate.1 Mitchell moved for summary judgJJ.
ment for return of all the funds removed
from
Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed for
OPINION
summary judgment seeking to disallow
BENCH, Judge:
Mitchell's claim.
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial court's entry
The trial court granted in part and denied
of &\itw3\arY yid^xveut \sv toot ot Maryrc\£ in part "both parties* motions for summary
Sims's estate. Lynda Wood cross-appeals. judgment. The trial court found that Mrs.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that

BACKGROUND
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long
married life together. Mr. Sims died in
1991, leaving a will which provided for the
creation of a bypass trust and designated
Mrs. Sims the personal representative of his
estate. He also named Mrs. Sims and Mitchell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was
1. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was entitled to the $2875.40 in interest and an additional

she was nonetheless entitled to the $96,642.55 from the estate checking account.
The trial court determined that the funds
were used for her necessary support and
maintenance and that there was therefore no
damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the
certificate of deposit, the trial court found
that $48,100 was undisputedly owed by Mrs.
Sims's estate and ordered that amount paid
$1900 as personal representative fees.

134

Utah

918 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The
trial court also allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to
retain the $2875.40 in interest income from
the certificate of deposit and the $1900
claimed as personal representative fees. Finally, the trial court found that Mrs. Sims's
acceptance of the $12,445.86 personal injury
settlement was an improper diversion of the
money from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded
that amount to Mr. Sims's estate.

[3,4] Mr. Sims declared in his will that

[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs.
Sims] without any conditions, all of the
income of said trust. The trustees shall
also distribute as much of the principal as
is necessary for her proper health, sup.
port, and maintenance and to maintain her
in the standard of living that she enjoyed
during my lifetime.
The trial court found that although Mrs.
Sims did not fund the trust, she was entitled
to the funds since they were used for her
support and maintenance. The record reflects that Mrs. Sims spent approximately
$76,000 from the estate's checking account on
her medical expenses. The balance of the
money drawn from the estate's checking account was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses.
The accounting report and affidavit of the
accountant for Mr. Sims's estate confirm
these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely
that the expense accounting was irrelevant
because any money used was "improperly
converted from the estate." Because Mitchell did not challenge Mrs. Sims's expenses
below, he is precluded from challenging them
on appeal. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053,
1056 (Utah App.)(holding acquiescence to opposing argument before trial court precluded
challenge on appeal), cert, denied, 899 P.2d
1231 (Utah 1995); see also Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (stating
court will review only those issues presented
below unless exceptional circumstances or
plain error are shown).2
The language of the will clearly states that
Mrs. Sims shall receive distributions from
the principal of Mr. Sims's estate "necessary
for her proper health, support, and maintenance." Mitchell argues that, in other jurisdictions, the use of "as is necessary" language requires the beneficiaries of a trust to
exhaust their own resources before invading
trust principal. See Dunklee v. Ketteringt
123 Colo. 43, 225 P.2d 853, 855-57 (1950).
But see In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont.
96, 885 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1994). We need
not address that question because Mr. Sims's

2. Mitchell also claims that Wood should be estopped from claiming Mrs. Sims's estate had no
liability towards Mr. Sims's estate. Mitchell con-

decline to honor such a distinction." Ong Int'l
(U.SA.) Inc. v..11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455
n. 31 (Utah 1993). Consequently, we will not

Mitchell appeals from the trial court's decision concerning the $96,642.55 that Mrs.
Sims withdrew from the estate checking account and the allowance of interest income
and personal representative fees from the
certificate of deposit. Wood cross-appeals
the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of Mr. Sims's estate on the personal injury
settlement amount and award of interest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of
law, we accord no deference to the trial
court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Id; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1989).
ANALYSIS
A. Estate Checking Account
[2] Mitchell first argues that the trial
court erred when it allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to keep the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims
had drawn from the checking account of Mr.
Sims's estate. Mitchell contends that because Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust provided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return
all the money to Mr. Sims's estate. We
disagree.
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will does not merely authorize the invasion of
the principal for "the necessities of life."
Dunklee, 225 P.2d at 853. Instead, Mr.
Sims's will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall
have access to the principal "to maintain her
[Mrs. Simsl in the standard of living that she
enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefore, we
agree with the trial court's determination
that "while there was a technical breach of
her fiduciary responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in no damages
and therefore is not actionable."
B. Certificate of Deposit
[5] Mitchell challenges the trial court's
award to Mrs. Sims's estate of $1900 in personal representative fees and $2875.40 that
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from
Mr. Sims's $50,000 certificate of deposit.
Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's estate
did not properly petition the trial court for
the $1900 in claimed personal representative
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3718(1) (1993). Wood stated in her Memorandum in Response to Mitchell's Motion for
Summary Judgment that she deducted from
the $50,000 u$1900 as fees for acting as personal representative." We need not decide
whether this qualifies as a proper claim pursuant to section 75-3-718(1), since Wood provided no evidence to support the fees after
Mitchell challenged them on summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Consequently, we reverse that portion of the
award.
[6] Mitchell also asserts that the trial
court improperly awarded Mrs. Sims's estate
$2875.40 in claimed interest from the certificate of deposit. Wood argues that the money was interest earned from the certificate of
deposit in Mr. Sims's name and that, since
Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the beneficiary of all income from Mr. Sims's estate,
she was entitled to keep the interest earned.
Mitchell simply contends that because the
trust was not funded, Mrs. Sims did not have
the right to keep that money. We disagree.
Again, although Mrs. Sims did not fund the
trust as Mr. Sims's will directed, Mr. Sims
3. Mrs. Sims's estate argues that because she was
Mr. Sims's "only surviving intestate heir " *h* «

explicitly stated that Mrs. Sims was to receive the income from Mr. Sims's estate
"without condition." Thus, the trial court
properly allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to retain
the interest from the certificate of deposit.
C. Settlement Proceeds
[7-9] Wood cross-appeals the trial court's
order to return to Mr. Sims's estate the
$12,445.86 received from the settlement of
Mr. Sims's personal injury claim. Wood argues that since Mrs. Sims claims to have paid
a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical expenses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settlement proceeds pursuant to Utah's survival
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides:
If prior to judgment or settlement the
injured person dies as a result of a cause
other than the injury received as a result
of the wrongful act or negligence of the
wrongdoer, the personal representative or
heirs of that person are entitled to receive
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by or on behalf of that injured
person as the result of his injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) (1992).
According to Utah's survival statute, Mrs.
Sims could only recover the personal injury
settlement in her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151,
213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that
she is entitled to the settlement proceeds is
misplaced. Behm is a wrongful death case
and not a personal injury settlement case.
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs
of the decedent personally hold claims for
lost support and other personal losses. See
Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App.
1994). In a personal injury case, by comparison, the cause of action is owned not by the
heirs, but by the injured party. As personal
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs.
Sims was therefore authorized to receive the
settlement only oh behalf of his estate. Mrs.
Sims could then present a claim to his estate
for out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the
survival statute. She has never done that.3
is evident that Mr. Sims did not die intestate.
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We therefore affirm the trial court's award of
the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate.
We have considered the other issues
raised, and we adjudge them to be without
merit. Accordingly, we do not address them.
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah
1989) ("Court need not analyze and address
in writing each and every argument, issue or
claim raised."), cert denied, — U.S.
,
116 S.Ct. 163,133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of the trial court
except as to the award of $1900 in personal
representative fees. That portion of the
judgment is reversed. The case is remanded
to the trial court for entry of a new judgment
consistent with this opinion.
DAVIS, Associate P.J., and JACKSON, J.,
concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Lewis Ricky YATES, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 950444-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 23, 1996.
Defendant was convicted of class A misdemeanor theft, following plea agreement before the Third District Court, Salt Lake City,
Leslie A. Lewis, J. Defendant appealed his
sentence. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that: (1) defendant was required to be
sentenced pursuant to statute amended following entry of plea agreement but prior to
his actual sentencing, and (2) defendant's
failure to appear for sentencing did not affect
property.

Thus, she could not take the settle-

his entitlement to lesser punishment set
forth in amended statute.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., concurred in result only, with
opinion.
1. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3)
Whether defendant is entitled to lesser
sentence when legislature reduces penalty
for crime charged after conviction but before
sentencing is question of law, to be reviewed
by Court of Appeals for correctness according no deference to trial court's conclusions.
2. Criminal Law <s=>1134(3)
Whether defendant's dilatory conduct affects his entitlement to lesser sentence is
question of law, to be reviewed by Court of
Appeals for correctness according no deference to trial court's conclusions.
3. Criminal Law <3=>1134(6)
Appellate court may affirm decision of
trial court on any proper ground.
4. Criminal Law e=>1130(5)
State's failure to cite to any helpful authority in support of its contention that resentencing defendant, convicted of class A
misdemeanor theft following plea agreement,
pursuant to statute amended following entry
of agreement but prior to actual sentencing
deprived state of benefit of its bargain under
contract theory precluded Court of Appeals
from considering such argument for first
time on appeal.
5. Criminal Law <S=>1206.3(2)
Defendants are entitled to benefit of
lesser penalty afforded by amended statute
made effective subsequent to their commission of offense and prior to their sentencing;
punishment is imposed as deterrent to crime,
as means of removing offender as harm from
society, and as means of rehabilitation of
offender, and not as punishment, and if legislature finds reduction in the penalty for given
crime necessary and appropriate to meet
those goals, then lesser penalty should be
granted to all defendants sentenced subsequent to modification.
ment as an intestate heir.
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FOR THE COURT:

Marilyn
ilyn M.Branch
Clerk of the Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on July 19, 1996, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
John E. Gates
Kim R. Wilson
David L. Pinkston
Snow, Christensen, & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
John L. McCoy
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
Third District Court
Attn: Appeals Clerk
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dated this July 19, 1996.

Robin Hutcheson
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 950734-CA
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 933900278 ES

APPENDIX "B"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
:

CASE NO. 933900278

MARJORIE S. SIMS,
Deceased.

The above-referenced matter is before the Court on reciprocal
Motions for Summary Judgment.

The petitioner, Neil Mitchell, as

successor personal representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims,
originally filed his Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order
from this Court that the original personal representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims, prior to her demise, failed to act in
accordance with Mr. Sims' Will in funding a bypass trust, and was
therefore required to return to Mr. Sims' Estate certain funds
which the petitioner believes were inappropriately used by Mrs.
Sims.

Inasmuch as Mrs. Sims is deceased, the petitioner seeks

repayment from the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims.
The

Estate

representative

of

Marjorie

Lynda

Wood,

S.

Sims,

through

has

filed

in

its

response

personal
to

the

aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment, a counter Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking from this Court an Order that the Estate
of G. Grant Sims is not entitled to repayment of sums used by Mrs.
Sims during her lifetime in her capacity as personal representative
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of Mr, Sims' Estate.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims does agree,

however, that certain cash funds retained by Mrs. Sims while she
was acting as personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Sims
should be returned

and has offered to return $48,100 of the

$52,875.4 0 that the petitioner claimed was not deposited into Mr.
Sims' Estate accounts. The difference between the $48,100 and the
$52,875.40 are outlined in the Memoranda filed by Mr. McCoy on
behalf of Lynda Wood, personal representative of the Marjorie S.
Sims Estate, and have not been challenged as being inappropriate by
the petitioner.
While it is without dispute in this matter that Mrs. Sims as
personal representative did not fund the trust as her deceased
husband's Will provided, the manner in which she used the funds
were, as a matter of law, funds that she would have been entitled
to receive had she funded the trust as Mr. Sims' Will provided. The
terms of the trust would have allowed Mrs. Sims to receive the
funds

she

took,

without

any

depletion

of

her

own

funds.

Accordingly, while there was a technical breach of her fiduciary
responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in
no damages and therefore is not actionable.
The intent of Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than
conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries.

That purpose was
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adhered to by Mrs. Sims, albeit not in strict compliance with the
formal procedures his Will required.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the Estate
of Marjorie Sims has no obligation to repay the Estate of G. Grant
Sims, with

the

exception

of the

$48,100 which

the personal

representative of Marjorie Sims has offered to return heretofore.
As those funds should properly be with the Estate of Grant Sims,
the Estate of Marjorie Sims is to repay that amount to his Estate
forthwith.
There is a question regarding funds received by Mrs. Sims in
her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims' Estate for
personal injury and a subsequent settlement after Mr. Sims died.
The evidence is undisputed that the personal injury claim arose
before Mr. Sims' death, but was settled after his death.

The

applicable statutory provisions provide that the only claims that
survive a death are claims for expenses related to the injury,
where the death of the personal injury claimant is not related to
the personal injury claim.

The settlement was for $12,445.86, and

as it was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it was for actual
expenses incurred by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury,
and pursuant to statute is required to be paid over to the personal
representative of the deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate, or the heirs
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of the deceased if a death was intestate. As Mr. Sims did not die
intestate, the funds were properly paid to Mrs. Sims in her
capacity as personal representative, and should have been deposited
in the accounts for the Estate, the funds representing expenses
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury
case.
Accordingly, the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims is also required
to repay the Estate of G. Grant Sims the sum of $12,445,86,
representing

an

improper

diversion

of

the

personal

injury

settlement funds received by Mrs. Sims after her husband's death.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court has granted the Summary
Judgment of the petitioner, Neil Mitchell, in part as it relates to
the personal injury settlement funds, and has granted the Summary
Judgment of the personal representative of the Marjorie S. Sims
Estate in part.

The Court determines that the amounts to be paid

from Marjorie S. Sims Estate to the G. Grant Sims Estate of $48,100
is not subject to this Summary Judgment, even though the Order
should contain a requirement for such payment based upon the fact
that

said

sums

have

been

offered

and

outstanding

for

some

substantial period of time and have not really been at issue.
Counsel for the parties are to confer and determine the manner
in which an appropriate Order encompassing the decisions of this
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Court on the reciprocal Motions for Summary
drafted.

Judgment

can be

Inasmuch as the Court has partially granted each Motion

for Summary Judgment, the Order needs to provide that an approval
as to form, or the participation in the preparation of an Order
encompassing the Court's rulings on these reciprocal Motions for
Summary Judgment does not constitute a waiver of either side to
object and pursue an appropriate appeal in relation to the Court's
ruling contained in the Order.
Once the Order has been properly prepared and approved by both
sides as being reflective of this Court's decision, the same should
be submitted to the Court for its reviey'and signature pursuant to
the Code of Judicial Administration.
Dated this

/J^dav of March/ 1995.

'TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
I CERTIFY THAT THIS ISA TRUE COPY OF AW
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON R I H IN THE THIRO
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH.

JE^Ojv—
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
lis /C_J
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this
A*J_J day of
March, 1995:

John L. McCoy
Attorney for Personal Representative
Lynda Wood
310 S. Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
John E. Gates
Kim R. Wilson
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Neil Mitchell
10 Exchange Place, llth Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145

JOHN E. GATES (A1169)
KIM R. WILSON (A3512)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, Successor
Personal Representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Of
MARJORIE S. SIMS,

Probate No. 933900278 ES
Timothy R. Hanson

Deceased.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Neil R. Mitchell
("Mitchell"), as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate
of G. Grant Sims (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking
allowance of Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of
Claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lynda Wood as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims (the
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment") 'seeking denial of Mitchell's
First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim came on for hearing
pursuant to notice, before the above-entitled court, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on January 13, 1995, at
2:00 p.m. and Kim R. Wilson appeared for Mitchell and John L.
McCoy appeared for Wood, and the Court having considered the

motions, the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the
motions and the files and records herein, having heard arguments
of counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated March 13,
1995, which is incorporated herein by reference, and being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Mitchell's entitlement to payment of the sum of

$48,100,00 is not contested, and Wood, be and the same is hereby
directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of $48,100.00
together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, until paid
at the statutory rate of 10% per annum.
2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and

denied in part.
3.

The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in

part and denied in part.
4.

In addition to the amounts provided in Paragraph 1,

Mitchell's claim is approved and allowed in the sum of $12,445.86
and Wood is directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of
$12,445.86 together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993,
until paid, at the statutory rate of 10% per annum.
5.

Recovery is denied for all other amounts sought in

Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim.

-2-

6.

In accordance with Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the court determines that there is no just reason for
delay, and this Order is deemed to be a f*nal judgment.
DATED this of) day of QLA/U
BY THE COURT/V.^LlO"/, V'+'

*

»3J«.»/
imothy R. Hansojv^^o
^
D i s t r i c t court Judg^..~-^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
C

DWTOCT ecus,. t^r

SNOW, CHRISTENSEW>* M^TINEAU

OP UTAH.

L-z-oi i w*.

:orneys for Neil R. Mitchell,
Successor Personal Representative
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims

n L. McCoy
y
ttorney for Lynda WoocJ^r Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Marjorie S/'Sims
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APPENDIX "C"

75-3-703

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

75-3-703, General duties — Relation and liability to persons interested in estate — Standing to sue.
( D A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard
of care applicable to trustees as described by Section 75-7-302. A personal
representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and this
code and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by this code,
the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is party
for the best interests of successors to the estate.
(2) A personal representative shall not be surcharged for acts of administration or distribution if the conduct in question was authorized at the time.
Subject to other obligations of administration, an informally probated will is
authority to administer and distribute the estate according to its terms. An
order of appointment of a personal representative, whether issued in informal
or formal proceedings, is authority to distribute apparently intestate assets to
the heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal representative is not aware of a pending testacy proceeding, a proceeding to vacate an
order entered in an earlier testacy proceeding, a formal proceeding questioning his appointment or fitness to continue, or a supervised administration
proceeding. Nothing in this section affects the duty of the personal representative to administer and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of
claimants, the surviving spouse, any minor and dependent children, and any
pretermitted child of the decedent as described elsewhere in this code.
(3) Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent,
a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at his death has
the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and courts of
any other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-703, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — This and the
next section are especially important sections
for they state the basic theory underlying the
duties and powers of personal representatives.
Whether or not a personal representative is supervised, this section applies to describe the
relationship he bears to interested parties. If a
supervised representative is appointed, or if
supervision of a previously appointed personal
representative is ordered, an additional obligation to the court is created. See § 75-3-501.
The fundamental responsibility is that of a
trustee. Unlike many trustees, a personal representative's authority is derived from appointment by the public agency known as the court.
But, the Code also makes it clear that the personal representative, in spite of the source of
his authority, is to proceed with the administration, settlement and distribution of the estate by use of statutory powers and in accordance with statutory directions. See §§ 75-3106 and 75-3-704. Subsection (2) is particularly
important, for it ties the question of personal
liability for administrative or distributive acts

to the question of whether the act was "authorized at the time." Thus, a personal representative may rely upon and be protected by a will
which has been probated without adjudication
or an order appointing him to administer
which is issued in no-notice proceedings even
though proceedings occurring later may
change the assumption as to whether the decedent died testate or intestate. See § 75-3-302
concerning the status of a will probated without notice and § 75-3-102 concerning the ineffectiveness of an unprobated will. However, it
does not follow from the fact that the personal
representative distributed under authority
that the distributees may not be liable to restore the property or values received if the assumption concerning testacy is later changed.
See §§ 75-3-909 and 75-3-1004. Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the time" within
the meaning of this section, but be "improper"
under the latter section.
Subsection (3) is designed to reduce or eliminate differences in the amenability to suit of
personal representatives appointed under this
Code and under traditional assumptions. Also,
the subsection states that so far as the law of
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PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
possessed by the personal representative.
Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its
termination, its lapse clears the title of devisees and heirs. Purchasers from devisees or
heirs who are "distributees" may be protected
also by § 75-3-910. The power over title of an
absolute owner is conceived to embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a
change of rights of possession. The relationship
of the personal representative to the estate is
that of a trustee. Hence, personal creditors or
successors of a personal representative cannot

75-3-711

avail themselves of his title to any greater extent than is true generally of creditors and successors of trustees. Interested persons who are
apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a
personal representative may secure themselves by use of the devices implicit in the several sections of Parts 1 and 3 of this chapter.
See especially S§ 75-3-501, 75-3-605. 75-3-607
and 75-3-611.
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding
section in the official text of the Uniform Probate Code is numbered § 3-711.

75-3-711. Improper exercise of power — Breach of fiduciary duty.
If the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the personal
representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from
breach of his fiduciary duty to the same extent as a trustee of an express trust.
The rights of purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative
shall be determined as provided in Sections 75-3-712 and 75-3-713.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-711, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — An interested person has two principal remedies to
forestall a personal representative from committing a breach of fiduciary duty. (1) Under
§ 75-3-607 he may apply to the court for an
order restraining the personal representative
from performing any specified act or from exercising any power in the course of administration. (2) Under S 75-3-611 he may petition the
court for an order removing the personal representative.
Evidence of a proceeding, or order, restraining a personal representative from selling,
leasing, encumbering or otherwise affecting ti-

tle to real property subject to administration, if
properly recorded under the laws of this state,
would be effective to prevent a purchaser from
acquiring a marketable title under the usual
rules relating to recordation of real property
titles.
In addition. SS 75-1-302 and 75-3-105 authorize joinder of third persons who may be involved in contemplated transactions with a
personal representative in proceedings to restrain a personal representative under
S 75-3-607.
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding
section in the official text of the Uniform Probate Code is numbered § 3-712.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors
and Administrators § 528.
C.J.S. — 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators §§ 184, 207, 210 to 213, 215, 219, 220,
242 to 251, 272, 322.
A.L.R. — Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending
action against estate, 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.
Agent or attorney, liability of executor or administrator, or his bond, for loss caused to estate by act or default of his, 28 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Liability of executor, administrator, trustee,
or his counsel for interest, penalty, or extra
taxes assessed against estate because of tax
law violations, 47 A.L.R.3d 507.
Overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, liability of executor or administrator to estate because of, 55 A.L.R.3d 785.
Garnishment against executor or administrator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301.
Key Numbers. — Executors and Administrators «=» 91, 103, 104, 116 to 120.
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75-3-907

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

75-3-907. Distribution in kind — Evidence.
If distribution in kind is made, the personal representative shall execute an
instrument or deed of distribution assigning, transferring, or releasing the
assets to the distributee as evidence of the distributee's title to the property.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-907, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — This and
sections following should be read with
§ 75-3-708 which permits the personal representative to leave certain assets of a decedents
estate in the possession of the person presumptively entitled thereto. The "release" contemplated by this section would be used as evidence that the personal representative had determined that he would not need to disturb the
possession of an heir or devisee for purposes of
administration.

Under S 75-3-710. a personal representative's relationship to assets of the estate is described as the "same power as an absolute
owner would have." A personal representative
may, however, acquire a full title to estate assets, as in the case where particular items are
conveyed to the personal representative by
sellers, transfer agents or others. The language
of this section is designed to cover instances
where the instrument of distribution operates
as a transfer, as well as those in which its operation is more like a release.

75-3-908. Distribution — Right or title of distributee.
Proof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of distribution
of assets in kind, or payment in distribution, from a personal representative,
is conclusive evidence that the distributee has succeeded to the interest of the
estate in the distributed assets, as against all persons interested in the estate,
except that the personal representative may recover the assets or their value
if the distribution was improper.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-908, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, S 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — The purpose
of this section is to channel controversies
which may arise among successors of a decedent because of improper distributions through
the personal representative who made the dis-

75-3-909.

tnbution, or a successor personal representative. Section 75-3-107 does not bar appointment proceedings initiated to secure appointment of a personal representative to correct an
erroneous distribution made by a prior representative. But see 5 75-3-1006.

Improper distribution — Liability of distributee.

Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of
adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly distributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to return the
property improperly received and its income since distribution if he has the
property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to return the value
as of the date of disposition of the property improperly received and its income
and gain received by him.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-909, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 4,
Editorial Board Comment. — The term
"improperly" as used in this section must be
read in light of § 75-3-703 and the manifest
purpose of this and other sections of the Code
to shift questions concerning the propriety of
various distributions from the fiduciary to the
distributees in order to prevent every administration from becoming an adjudicated matter.

Thus, a distribution may be "authorized at the
time" as contemplated by § 75-3-703, and still
be "improper" under this section. Section
75-3-703 is designed to permit a personal representative to distribute without risk in some
cases, even though there has been no adjudication. When an unadjudicated distribution has
occurred, the rights of persons to show that the
basis for the distribution (e.g., an informally
probated will, or informally issued letters of
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FILED DISTRiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 h 1991
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF

%8&

GEORGE GRANT SIMS
I, GEORGE GRANT SIMS, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah#
being of- sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make and
publish this, my Last Will and Testament.
ARTICLE JT
REVOCATION £F PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS
I hereby revoke all other wills and codicils heretofore made
by me.
ARTICLE II
WIFE AND BENEFICIARIES
I am married to MARJORIE S. SIMS (hereinafter referred to as
•my wife"). The beneficiary of my estate will be my wife (either
outright or in trust, or both, as hereinafter set forth) or, if
she predeceases me, the beneficiaries of my estate shall be the
individuals named or indicated in Article V.
ARTICLE III
PAYMENT OF TAXES, DEBTS AND EXPENSES
I direct that all of my due and unpaid debts, all expenses
of my last illness, burial, and the administration of my estate,
and all taxes due at the date of my death or as a result of my
death, shall be paid as soon after my death as practical.

QP\ <7

ARTICLE .IV
BEQUEST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EFFECTS
I hereby g i v e ,

devise

and

tangible personal property

bequeath

certain

items

be, prepared,

my

t o t h o s e p e r s o n s i n t h e manner s e t

f o r t h i n a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t or l i s t which has b e e n ,
will

of

or

which

d a t e d and s i g n e d by me and a t t a c h e d t o

this

W i l l and w h i c h s t a t e m e n t o r l i s t I i n t e n d t o be i n e x i s t e n c e
the t i m e

of

my d e a t h .

the devisees
effects,

Said

thereof.

lirt

describes

the

including a l l

if

and e f f e c t s

household f u r n i t u r e

part

of

my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s
not s e t

the

hereinafter

forth

residue

set

and

A l l of t h e r e s t and r e s i d u e of my p e r s o n a l
and c o n t e n t s ,

a u t o m o b i l e s , and t h e l i k e , I l e a v e t o my w i f e
However,

items devised

at

of

in
my

me,

all

of

the attached
estate

if

jewelry,

she s u r v i v e s

my p e r s o n a l
list

and

be

shall

me.

property
become a

disposed

of

as

forth.
ARTICLE V
BEQUEST OF RESIDUE £F ESTATE

If
divide
referred

my w i f e
the
to

TRUST") and

s u r v i v e s m e , my p e r s o n a l

residue

of

my e s t a t e

into

representative

two p a r t s ,

hereinafter

a s P a r t A ( t h e -GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX
Part

B (the

"MARJORIE S.

SIMS

shall

BYPASS

MARITAL DEDUCTION

PORTION") e a c h a s c e r t a i n e d a s h e r e i n a f t e r s e t f o r t h i n A r t i c l e
VIII.

2

0?S

The H a r j o r i e S.
distributed

as

Sims

soon

o u t r i g h t and t r e e of

after

Marital

Deduction Portion

my d e a t h

as

practical

to

shall
my

be

wife

trust.

The George Grant Sims E s t a t e Tax Bypass T r u s t s h a l l be held
i n Trust by t h e T r u s t e e s h e r e i n a f t e r
wife

during

her l i f e t i m e .

w i t h o u t any c o n d i t i o n s r

named f o r t h e b e n e f i t of my

The T r u s t e e s

a l l of

Trustees

shall

necessary

for her proper h e a l t h ,

shall

distribute

the income of

also distribute

a s mu^h of
support,

said

t o her

trust.

The

t h e p r i n c i p a l as

is

and m a i n t e n a n c e and

to

m a i n t a i n her i n t h e s t a n d a r d ot l i v i n g t h a t s h e e n j o y e d during my
lifetime.

Upon t h e d e a t h o f my w i f e ,

the following persons,

t h e T r u s t e e s h a l l pay

the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c

to

sums:

$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o DONALD E. SMITH, MD
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o MARK MUIR, MD
The T r u s t e e
i n the f o l l o w i n g

I f any o f
then deceased,

shall

then d i s t r i b u t e

the r e s i d u e of t h i s Trust

manner:
ONE-THIRD:

ELNA MITCHELL

ONE-THIRD:

NEIL MITCHELL

ONE-THIRD:

LINDA WOOD

the above i n d i v i d u a l s ,

e x c e p t LINDA WOOD,

are

h i s o r h e r s h a r e s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d t o h i s or

h e r i s s u e by r i g h t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .

As t o LINDA WOOD, i f

s h o u l d be d e c e a s e d a t t h e t i m e of my d e a t h ,

3

t h e n her s h a r e

she
shall

be distributed to IAN MITCHELL and-AMY MITCHELL, in equal shares.
If my wife predeceases me, the residue of my estate shall be
distributed

to:

DONALD E. SMITH, MD. and MARK

MUIR, MD.,

$10,000*00 each and to ELNA MITCHELL, NEIL MITCHELL and LINDA
WOOD, one-third each,
predecease

me,

representation*

then

but if any of them, except LINDA WOOD,
to his or her

issue

by

right

of

If LINDA WOOD predeceases me, then her share

shall be distributed to IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHELL, in equal
shares.
ARTICLE VI
COMMON DISASTER
In the event my wife and I die under such circumstances that
it cannot be determined which of us were first to die, all
properties ot my estate shall be administered as though my wife
were the last to die*
ARTICLE VII
APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES
1.

Appointment of Personal Representative.

I appoint my

wife to be Personal Representative of my Will. If my wife does
not survive me or is otherwise unable or unwilling to serve as
personal representative, then I appoint my nephew, NEIL MITCHELL,
to serve as co-personal representatives of my estate.

In the

event both are unable or unwilling to serve as Personal
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Representative of my Will, the Personal Representative shall be
IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL.
2.

Appointment of Trustees.

MITCHELL,

I appoint my wife and NEIL

to be the co-trustees of the George Grant Sims Estate

Tax Bypass Trust created under this Will.

In the event either

Trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, the other of them shall
serve as Trustee.

In the event both are unable or

unwilling to

serve, the other of them shall serve as Trustee.

In the *vent

both are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the Trustee
shall be IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL.
3.

Appointment of Guardian and Conservator.

In the event I

become incompetent during my lifetime, I direct that my wife be
appointed the guardian of my person and the conservator ot my
estate.

If she is unable or unwilling to serve, I direct that

NEIL MITCHELL be appointed guardian and conservator or, if he is
unable or unwilling to serve, then IAN MITCHELL, his son shall
serve as the sole guardian and conservator.
conservator shall serve without bond.

My guardian and

I direct that as long as

there are funds available I be taken care of in my home and not
placed in a nursing home or similar facility unless home care is
impossible because of the nature of the care required.

It is my

desire and direction that whatever funds are necessary be spent
for my support, care and maintenance without regard or concern
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GQC

for

conserving

beneficiaries

any

portion

of

my

estate

for

subsequent

'thereof.
ARTICLE V I I I

ASCERTAINMENT OF GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS TRUST
AND MARJORIE S . SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION PORTION.
If

my w i f e s u r v i v e s m e , P a r t A a n d P a r t B a s s e t f o r t h

A r t i c l e V s h a l l be a s c e r t a i n e d
1.
estate

There s h a l l

first

follows:

be d e t e r m i n e d

t h e v a l u e o f toy g r o s s

( i n c l u d i n g p r o p e r t y not a d m i n i s t e r e d

p u r p o s e of
2.

the United States Federal

There

the extent

shall

be d e d u c t e d

allowable

Estate

and a l l

claims against

any e s t a t e ,
referred

Tax,

of

all

inheritance,

Estate

in the

computation

and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

of

taxes,

shall

be

above.

C r e d i t A g a i n s t Tax u n d e r S e c t i o n 2 0 1 0 o f
a s amended (or i t s

(currently

$600,000)

successor)

the Internal

Unified
Revenue

r e d u c e d by t h e

o f ( 1 ) a l l i t e m s i n c l u d a b l e i n my e s t a t e f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e
p u r p o s e s w h i c h a r e d i s p o s e d of

the

deducted

legacy or s u c c e s s i o n

P a r t A s h a l l be e q u a l t o t h e a m o u n t

1986,

to

expenses,

t h a t may p a s s f r e e of F e d e r a l E s t a t e Tax by r e a s o n o t t h e

Code of

the

Tax.

The a m o u n t s o d e t e r m i n e d

to Article III

for

b u t t h e r e s h a l l n o t be

transfer,

to in A r t i c l e I I I .

paid out pursuant

funeral

my e s t a t e

i n my e s t a t e )

from s u c h v a l u e t h e a m o u n t ,

as a d e d u c t i o n

Federal

3.

as

in

in previous A r t i c l e s ot t h i s

total
tax
Will

q&£

or which pass outside of this Will but only if such items do not
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction or the
federal estate tax charitable deduction, and (2) the amount of
any administration expenses claimed as income tax rather than
estate tax deductions*

Part A shall be held, administered and

distributed as set forth in Article V,
For purposes o£ allocating my residuary estate between Part
A and Part B, all property owned by me at the time of my death
shall be valued

at the same value that was used for federal

estate tax purposes.

If I should die possessed of any terminable

or

which

other

interest

cannot

quality

for

the

"marital

deduction" under the Federal Estate Tax law, such interest shall
be allocated to this Part A.

If there are any federal or state

estate and inheritance taxes due and payable on my death, they
shall be paid out of the toregoing assets allocated to Part A.
No estate taxes shall be paid out of Part B.
4.

Part B shall consist ot the rest, residue and remainder

of my estate not disposed of pursuant to the foregoing provisions
of my Will.

I hereby direct that whenever possible, assets that

will qualify for the federal estate tax "marital deduction" shall
be allocated to Part B after, however, Part A is properly funded.
If there

are

assets

that

will

not qualify

for

the

marital

deduction I direct that those assets be allocated, to the extent
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possible without exceeding the limits set forth above, to Part A
above.

If there are assets that will cause the limitations on

Part A to be exceeded, those assets shall be allocated to Part B
although they will not qualify for the marital deduction*

The

decision of my Personal Representative as to the property to be
allocated to Part A and Part B shall be final and conclusive and
binding upon all beneficiaries.

However, the property allocated

to Part B shall have an aggregate fair market value- clearly
representative of the appreciation or depreciation in the value
to the date of dates of each distribution of all property then
available for distribution.

Part B shall not be diminished by

any estate, inheritance, transfer, legacy or succession taxes or
duties, either state or federal.

If the value of my residuary

estate is less than the amount that may be allocated to Part A
(currently $600,000), no part ot my estate shall be allocated to
Part B.
ARTICLE IX
TRUSTEE POWERS
Trustee shall have the additional powers, authorities, and
discretions set forth in Part 4 f Chapter 7, Title 75 of the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code

(or its successor),

which are

reference.

e

incorporated herein by

I , GEORGE GRANT SIMS# the T e s t a t o r , s i g n my name t o t h i s
i n s t r u m e n t t h i s ljS_

day of J u l y , 1 9 9 1 ,

and b e i n g f i r s t

duly

sworn, do hereby declare t o the undersigned a u t h o r i t y that I sign
i t w i l l i n g l y (or w i l l i n g l y d i r e c t another t o s i g n for me), that I
execute

it

a s my f r e e

expressed in i t ,

and v o l u n t a r y

act

and t h a t I am e i g h t e e n

for

the

purposes

(18) y e a r s of age or

o l d e r , of sound mine, and under no cqfiffstpraint or un&e

influence.

GEORGE GRANT SIMS, Testator
WE, the u n d e r s i g n e d , as w i t n e s s e s , s i g n our names t o
t h i s instrument, being f i r s t duly sworn, and do hereby declare to
t h e u n d e r s i g n e d a u t h o r i t y t h a t the T e s t a t o r

s i g n s and e x e c u t e

t h i s instrument as h i s Last Will and Testament and that he s i g n s
i t w i l l i n g l y and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of
t h e T e s t a t o r and or each o t h e r , hereby s i g n s t h i s W i l l as w i t n e s s
t o the T e s t a t o r ' s s i g n i n g ,
the Testator

and that t o the b e s t of our knowledge

i s 18 y e a r s of age or o l d e r ,

of sound mind, and

under no c o n s t r a i n t or undue i n f l u e n c e .
NAME

ADDRESS

Jx&r

f&

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
) SS.
STATE OF UTAH .
)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o before roe by GEORGE GRANT SIMS/
the T e s t a t o r ,
£tL£MAJ
witnesses,

f.
this

or,

and s u b s c r i b e d

QV^/eTcJfJ

and

and s w o r n
MM/AsJ

to before

d. DuA/rf

me by
_,

J?&? day of J u l y , 1991.

My Commission E x p i r e s :

N0TAR1

itfC**-

Residl

i^gv^W
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